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COVID-19 travel restrictions and the International Health
Regulations – Call for an open debate on easing of travel
restrictions
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
International Journal of Infectious Diseases
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/ locate / i j idThe COVID-19 pandemic caused by the novel coronavirus
(SARS-CoV-2) has caused national governments worldwide to
mandate several generic infection control measures such as
physical distancing, self-isolation, and closure of non-essential
shops, restaurants schools, among others. Some models suggest
physical distancing would have to persist for 3 months to
mitigate the peak effects on health systems and could be required
on an intermittent basis for 12 to 18 months (Flaxman et al.,
2020).
Apart from these control measures travel restrictions during the
early phase of the China outbreak were useful to confine it to
Wuhan, the major source of the outbreak (Kraemer et al., 2020)
although ultimately these measures did not prevent the spread of
COVID-19 to other regions of China. The global spread of the SARS-
CoV-2 has clearly been associated with regional and international
travel which has contributed to the pandemic (Candido et al.,
2020). To limit cross-border spread, both regionally and globally,
many countries have swiftly adopted sweeping measures, includ-
ing full lockdowns of shops, companies, shutting down airports,
imposing travel restrictions and completely sealing their borders,
to contain transmission (Gostin and Wiley, 2020). The grounding of
international travel as part of the global response to prevent spread
has caused profound disruption of travel and trade and has
threatened the survival of many airlines, travel companies, and
associated businesses.
Travel bans to affected areas or denial of entry to passengers
coming from affected areas are usually not effective in preventing
the importation of cases but have a significant economic and social
impact. Since the WHO declaration of a public health emergency of
international concern on 30 January 2020, and as of 8th April, 2020,
180 countries have reported to WHO additional health measures
that significantly interfere with international traffic in relation to
travel to and from China or other countries, ranging from denial of
entry of passengers, visa restrictions or quarantine for returning
travellers (WHO, 2020a). To re-start the world economy again it
will be important to ease travel restrictions as soon as possible.
Whilst travel restriction measures that significantly interfere with
international traffic may be justified at the beginning of an
outbreak, since they allow countries time to implement effective
preparedness measures based on careful risk assessment, they
should be based on a reasoned scientific evaluation of the availablehttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2020.04.029
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license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).evidence on their possible effectiveness. They should also be time-
limited and reconsidered and revisited on a regular basis as better
information on both the effectiveness and the socio-economic
impact of the measures emerges. Thus an open debate is now
required on when and how they need to be lifted. This debate could
usefully be framed in the context of the International Health
Regulations.
The purpose of the WHO International Health Regulations
(WHO, 2020b) is to ‘prevent, protect against, control and provide a
public health response to the international spread of disease in
ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health
risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international
traffic and trade’. The IHR are focussed on public health events
where 4 key considerations are present (WHO, 2005):
1. Is the public health impact of the event serious?
2. Is the event unusual or unexpected?
3. Is there a significant risk of international spread?
4. Is there a significant risk of international travel or trade
restrictions?
In the case of COVID-19, the answer to all the above questions is
‘YES’ and this is what led to the Emergency Committee
recommending to the Director General in January that COVID-19
constituted a Public Health Emergency of International Concern.
Within the IHR the declaration of a PHEIC opens up the possibility
for WHO to make Temporary Recommendations on measures that
should be implemented to help bring the event under control. The
COVID-19 Emergency Committee made a wide range of recom-
mendation to the Director General but the Committee specifically
stated “The Committee does not recommend any travel or trade
restriction based on the current information available”.
The WHO's advice, based on many years of international
outbreak response, was considered by many to be reasonable and
evidence-based but the recommendation on travel restrictions has
not been heeded by governments and politicians in the face of
rapid spread of COVID-19 between countries. This highlights the
apparent dissonance between scientific advice and political
realities [and indeed public perception]. As many countries are
now approaching the peak or flattening phase of the epidemic
curve this dissonance will again become forefront and an openSociety for Infectious Diseases. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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need to be considered:
1. Why have several countries systematically ignored WHO's
advice on not restricting travel during the COVID-19 outbreak?
Is it that the advice was considered wrong or that the advice was
inconsistent with the public perception that closing borders was
a “sensible” thing to do?
2. Given that countries have unilaterally made decisions to close
down international travel, how can we get better science and
evidence into decisions about lifting these restrictions as the
outbreak resolves so that international trade and the global
economy can start to recover? It seems inevitable that countries
will move at different speeds to these decisions, reflecting the
different evolution of the outbreak in each country. Promoting a
risk-based approach to lifting the travel restrictions that might
vary from country to country could provide a way forward but it
will need a degree of international coordination to avoid a
random, possibly chaotic, certainly confusing, and probably
ineffective process. This coordination should come from WHO in
line with the mandate given to WHO by the member states
through the IHR. Countries with still very few cases and
potential to arrest and eliminate the few cases that they have,
should not open up travel without very strict quarantine for
arrivals. This could reduce the conflict between science-based
advice and political decision making.
3. What mitigating measures will be available to reduce the risk of
a resurgence of the outbreak as public health measures,
including travel restrictions, are eased? In particular what role
(if any) will PCR and immunity (serology) testing play in
managing the impact of lifting restrictions? It will be imperative
that countries easing restrictions (whether social or physical
distancing or travel restrictions) have in place resources and
capacity for detecting, testing and quarantining all new cases
arising as well as tracing and tracking all contacts.
There has been evidence of global capacity issues with PCR tests
and possibly of market influencing to secure testing capacity in
some countries. Should there be, within the spirit of the recent G20
statement (G20, 2020), international cooperation facilitated by
WHO to ensure testing capacity is made available in a managed
way to countries as and when they need it most? Indeed, the WHO
the 7th April certified the first two PCR tests (WHO, 2020c) and
advice on the use of point-of-care tests (WHO, 2020d).
The majority of persons who have been infected SARS-CoV-2
recover and appear to be immune and non-infectious (To et al.,
2020) although recurrence have been reported but need further
confirmation (Zhou et al., 2020). We do not know for how long such
immunity lasts but neutralizing antibodies was found more than
two years after infection with SARS-CoV (Wu et al., 2007). A
validated, specific and sensitive test to detect SARS-CoV-2-
specific-IgG is urgently required to support countries’ efforts to
control the outbreak. There is currently no evidence to recommend
serology as an immunity passport and we do not have any long-
term data about how effective and long-lasting immunity might be
but there will undoubtedly be pressure to implement such
measures. It would be helpful if this was coordinated to ensure
a consistent approach globally, with consistent standards and
requirements, and such an approach is also clearly within WHO's
IHR mandate.
As SARS-CoV-2 continues to spread across different geographi-
cal regions, with different epidemiological patterns being seen, we
await how it will evolve over time and across seasons [in both the
north and south hemisphere]. Meanwhile ongoing proactive
surveillance should be maintained and the search for effective
serological tests, treatments and vaccines be pursued vigorously.As we start to emerge from the initial phase of the outbreak,
international cooperation, collaboration, leadership and authority
will be critical – where will it come from?
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